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KAUL, VISHWANATH

TITLE:

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
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

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
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


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ANTI-PRAGMATISM

BY

VISHWANATH KAUL, M. A.,

MEMBER OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, LONDON.

SENIOR FELLOW OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE
OF PHILOSOPHY, AMALNER.

“O Philosophy! Thou director of our lives, the
friend of virtue, and enemy to vice! What were we,
what were the life of man, but for thee.”

(CICERO).

INDERGANJ STREET,

GWALIOR, C. I.

1928.

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MOST
RESPECTFULLY
DEDICATED
TO

MY KIND AND MERCIFUL PATRON,
Rao Sahib, L. B. Mulye, B.A. (Hons.),
Hon'ble Member for Education and Municipalities.
GWALIOR GOVERNMENT.

PRE-PREFACE



My gentle reader! You must have seen as many pre-faces as the number of books you have read, because most books do contain a preface, or something in lieu of a preface called a Prologue or Foreword, which again means the same thing as Preface. I wonder if you have seen any book containing a pre-preface! Here what you are reading is a pre-preface, the object of which is to give you a rough idea as to what 'Pre-faces' are, and why they are prefixed to books.

The word 'Prepreface' here has been intended by me to mean *the philosophy of prefacing*, or the wisdom of writing prefaces. Why are they written? An attempt to do justice to this subject would be a theme big enough for a separate volume, which amount of space can not be conceded even to a Preface, to say nothing of a Pre-preface. Had it been an Introduction, it would have been an altogether different thing. An *introduction* may be even twenty times as big as the main body of

the book. So I postpone the task, and prefer to enumerate here only the chief purposes for which a preface is generally written.

“Preface” is a compound word. ‘Pre’ means *before*, and ‘face’ means *countenance* or *appearance*. A preface is, therefore, obviously that which you find in the very beginning of a book. A Preface is that which you have to face before you face the real contents of the book. It is that which you have to encounter before the book proper makes its appearance.

In Hindi we call preface a *Bhoomica* (भूमिका). Considering the root ‘भू’ which is common to words like भूमिका and भूगोल etc., and which means the earth, it would appear that the word *bhoomica* means the ground or rather the *ground plan* of the book, whose *bhoomica* it is, and whose plot or the nature of contents, or the circumstances of publication it is intended to give the reader an idea of.

In Arabic, the nearest equivalent of preface is *Deebaja*, whose literal meanings are:—1. *دوئے کعاب* 2. *سرنامہ* 3. *مقدمہ کتاب*. The first word means the face of the book, its appearance or first glimpse. The second word means head-lines, and the third signifies the controversial topic or subject matter of the book.

The Persian translation of preface is *Deebacha*, which means *خطبہ کتاب* or *تمہید*. The former word means a definition or beginning of the book; and the latter word means an inscription on the book.

It would appear from the foregoing paragraphs that *Preface* very nearly means the same thing in all these languages. Now, the practice which is in vogue at present, is to give

briefly in the preface the cause or occasion for the publication of the book, what we call in Persian *سبب تالیف یا تصنیف کتاب*. The following are some of the principal reasons for which a book is written. I shall feel much obliged to my readers if they kindly communicate to me more reasons which actuate writers to publish books, so that they may also be included in the incomplete list, which is given below.

1. To make a show or display of one's ability or—ties.
2. Where a genuine necessity exists, with a view to bequeath a new thought, theory or discovery to the world.
3. Some books are written to order, to comply with the wishes of a Text Book Committee, Ruling Prince, or similar other body in authority.
4. When to meet the wishes of friends and to save the trouble of copying, one has to go in reluctantly to a press; *e.g.*, I should like to quote the following lines from the preface of a highly philosophical work in Urdu poetry condemning marriage. It might give to my readers an approximate idea of the mental attitude, which I desire to reckon under item 4.

”نقل کرنیکی محنت بچا نے نہ کہ اشعار
مندرجہ کتاب ہذا کو اشنتم ار دینے سے غرض تھی
کہ مصنف کو طوعاً و کرہاً بارگاہ کار پرودازان مطبع
عالیجاہی میں روئے نیاز لانا پڑا - اس سے یہم
ہرگز مفہوم نہ ہونا چاہئے کہ ان نوواردان عام
ہستی کے ساتھ ہر ایک شخص کو خواہ بہ نظر مہر

خواہ بہ نظر قہر سر بازار چار چشم ہونیکا استحقاق حاصل ہے - صرف چند منتخب احباب کی طیب خاطر منظور ہے کہ یہہ اوراق مطبع سے زیب و زینت پانپکی غرض سے تیار بیتہے ہیں - ورنہ کہان مصنف عزت گزین اور کہان شور و غوغائے جمہور انا -

5. Copies of Testimonials, Farewell Addresses, and Theses for Ph. D. or LL. D. Degrees, and similar other things are printed chiefly in order to give them a presentable form, and also for reason No. 4, *i. e.*, to save the trouble and labour of copying.

6. To command a sale, written expressly for the purpose of sale, where the author is obviously, more often than not, labouring under the necessity of writing. It may be the hired authors in the Abdul Lillahi Press of Lahore, Lucknow, etc., or the men in the Fleet Street of London, or for the matter of that, similar other places anywhere in the world. Though, as it is well said; "Necessity is the mother of invention," they frequently succeed in getting up something of considerable size, which is fairly good and serviceable literature for the class of readers for whom it is written.

7. Some books are written with scarcely any serious motives capable of being defined, though once they come into existence they fulfil a useful purpose, say at least of light literature intended for fun and merriment. A book originally written only because the subject matter of it was bursting the sides of its author with laughter. Such an one is Chonch

Puran, a book in Hindi describing a few scenes from the life of a student of Allahabad University; published by Dwedi Brothers, Allahabad.

8. Administration Reports, Statistics, Gazetteers, and similar other things issued by Governments, are a class of publications by themselves. They seldom require a preface, an apology, an explanation, or justification for their publication, because the need for their periodical appearance is so great and obvious that every one is supposed to know it. They are, therefore, suitably prefixed with a Foreword, Introduction, Summary or Review of the voluminous contents of the books. In all efficient and progressive governments, such publications are a real necessity, for they facilitate and lubricate the machinery of Government on one side, and on the other keep the public duly informed on all matters of vital importance which concern the nation. Where a Government is not progressive, or one born of the principle of self-determination, these publications become a necessity by adoption, and the Political Minister is confidentially directed to help the Heads of various Departments in giving a complexion to their Administration Reports, before they are printed and made accessible to the neighbouring governments and the public at large. The guiding principle of the governments under the latter circumstance or in other words their chief defect, is to put in as much of show, *bhaphka* and polish as possible—camouflaging of untoward facts and incidents, ignoring of the existing evils, and denouncing of the remedies suggested by public, and 'making the black look white' logic to characterise such writings.

9. A simple, though foolish, reason of publishing a book is sometimes nothing more than a mere innocent desire to see

one's name in print. "It is pleasant sure to see one's name in print. A book is a book, although there is nothing in it." Schoolboys, when they for the first time see their name even in type-script, say by corresponding with some commercial firm and getting a typed reply, feel gratified. Sometime they actually take a cutting of it and paste it on the tool-bag of their cycles. We may call it vanity or the desire for self-advertisement, if we like. Psychologists have come to the conclusion that it is one of the deep-seated instincts of all vertebrate animals including man of course. To use a technical word from William McDougall's Social Psychology, we may call it the instinct of self-assertion in contrast to the instinct of self-abasement or self-abnegation. Reason No. 1, mentioned above, *i. e.*, making a show of one's abilities, also is an expression of the instinct of self-assertion but it is conscious assertion, while the form taken notice of under No. 9, *i. e.*, the current paragraph, is an unconscious expression.

10. One class of books is written *in memoriam*. To commemorate somebody or some incident, mostly a deceased person, with a view to express our affection, gratitude or respect towards him or her. "The Severing Seas" by Mr. L. M. Cramp, is a good example of this important class of books in which sometime the best of thoughts and feelings find their way. The reason is that such books are seldom written under compulsion except the compulsion of one's own affection or devotion to the lost one, and this sort of compulsion is a very wholesome compulsion for a writer to write his very best.

Moreover, such writers are free from the desire for monetary gain, and so they can write freely with an unrestricted pen. They can afford to consult their own tastes and feelings to a

good extent, for on such occasions they are not very much under necessity of submitting scrupulously to the tastes of the general reading public, being free from the desire of money, that accursed desire which dwarfs a man's capacities in almost every direction except the economical activities.

A philosopher at times in his sweep of thought feels inclined to think that it is a futile attempt to perpetuate the memory of one's beloved by writing a book, an epitaph, an ode, or a sonnet. Books, too, have an age like men. Everything in this world is ephemeral. Fair mausoleums waste with time; foul graves grow purged thereby. Still in practice it gives one much satisfaction, comfort, and solace, to have written something in memory of the gone one. Nothing endures eternally, is all right; nevertheless we can practically expect many a thing to endure a good length of time. To one, who can write, and wants to write something in honour of the gone one, it is a duty to write, and *to attend to duty is one's Duty*. For example, we must pay off our debts; even though we are sure from the philosophic standpoint that there shall come a day, when the creditor along with his whole line of successors shall have disappeared, as well as the debtor with his whole line of successors; and when there shall remain no trace of either side, the debt shall be extirpated automatically, for it is only a relation which subsists between a debtor and a creditor. Let us, therefore, postpone the payment of our debts till that far off imaginary point of time. Would it be fair, but? Would the prevailing Moral Code, as well as the Civil Procedure Code, tolerate it?

11. One class of books is written not so much to teach as to promote and provoke thought on the subject matter of those

books. Their exclusive aim is to attract attention of their readers, and to stimulate thought on the particular subject of which the author may be a supporter or an advocate.

12. There may be other reasons, which my readers can think out for themselves, and kindly communicate to me.

In this age of abundance of books, one can, even at one's best, read only a small fraction of the total number of books accessible to him. So the problem arises what little to read, and what much to reject. It can not be gainsaid, however, that everybody ought to purchase and read in the line of his own genius. Without trespassing upon this generally accepted principle, one has frequently to deviate a little from this imaginary straight line, which has got only length but no breadth; of course only to return back to his main path again. The reason is obvious. Present-day accomplishment consists in knowing something of everything, and everything of something; and everything of something cannot be known and understood without knowing a little of many other things besides. It is with this aim in view that a man has to make himself fond of general reading alongside with the necessity of reading in his special line.

The title-page and the preface of a book at once help the intending reader to decide whether or not that book is suitable for his reading; though a thorough judgment about the book a reader can form only after a complete reading of it. But for this detailed reading of every book *merely* to form a judgment about it, a reader can find no time, unless of course he happens to be a whole time paid member of the staff of a newspaper, and entrusted with the task of reviewing books for that newspaper. In order, therefore, to facilitate the general

reader in his task of selection of books, it is apparent that the title-page and preface of a book, ought to be such as to give a genuine clue to its contents.

All good prefaces ought to give, and generally do give, in brief the theme of the book, an idea about its scope and method if the book is a voluminous and important one and comes out from the pen of a well-known author; the viewpoint from which it is written, whether for a casual reader, a lay man, or a serious student of the subject; a very brief outline of the ground covered, if possible; and lastly the reason for its publication. This reason for publication if it happens to be Reason No. 1, *i. e.*, self-assertion, is seldom confessed.

One chief object served by them (Prefaces), is to narrate the occasion, if any, for which the book was written, so that it may be read in the same light; and if there are any departures or divergences from what it ought to have been, they may be indulged in. Also to narrate the circumstances under which it is written. A gentle hint as to the general plan of the book enables a reader to know whether it is the thing he wants to read or not, or he can lay his hand on something better.

My kind reader! I am afraid, I have already tired your patience and dulled your desire to read the main part of this book, by giving you a rather curious and clumsily written thing "Pre-preface." If, however, I have succeeded in establishing my point that 'Prefaces' are written not merely in obedience to tradition, or as a matter of form, but that there is a real necessity for them, I will have the consolation that I have done what I wanted to do. Some writer abler than myself, I

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venture to hope, may some day take upon himself the task of writing an exhaustive and instructive book exclusively on the subject of "Philosophy of Preface", or "The Art and Science of Writing Prefaces".

V. K.

PREFACE.

Having taken up so much of your precious time in demonstrating the necessity of a preface, I have in other words devolved upon myself the responsibility of writing a preface to this book. But you should not by any means expect from me an ideal preface, because I have expressed a few thoughts as to what prefaces are, or what they ought to be. I am no exception to the axiomatic truth that it is very easy to say a thing, but very difficult to do it.

The pages that follow can hardly be said to constitute a book, nor they were originally written for publication. It is only a paper read by me on the 15th of December, 1926, at the Indian Institute of Philosophy, in Amalner (East Khandesh); where I had the pleasure of staying for some time as a research scholar in Philosophy, and was in receipt of a scholarship of Rs. 100 per month, free furnished quarters extra. This Institute, which is unique of its kind, owes its origin as well as its continuance to the munificence of its chief supporter, Seth Motilal Maneckchand *alias* Pratap Seth, K. I. H.

Here I have to tell you only two things. 1. What is the subject of the book? 2. What is my motive in publishing it?

1. Many of my readers must have got an idea as to the subject matter of the book from its very title, Antipragmatism. However, for the facility of those of my readers, whom the name of the book may have appeared as odd or uncommon, and therefore unintelligible, I attempt to give in very few words an idea of the contents, for the rest shall appear on reading the pages themselves.

Antipragmatism means a criticism or opposition of that well-known doctrine of modern metaphysics, which is extant by the name of Pragmatism. Philosophers are divided into two camps: Idealists and Empiricists. Their classification into rather new and strange categories Pragmatists and Antipragmatists, is somewhat akin to it. Pragmatists say that Truth is in the making. Antipragmatists say that Truth is already made, unchangeable, eternal, and absolute. Pragmatic truth, or in other words the successful ways of handling experience, are called *Denkmittels* by German philosophers. This doctrine may be a new discovery to Europe and America, but it was known to Buddhist philosophers in India more than two thousand years ago, and was called *arthakriyakaritva*. I have based my criticism chiefly upon the book 'Pragmatism' by Professor William James, of U.S.A., who is the best exponent of this doctrine.

2. My motive in publishing this paper is No. 11, as given in the pre-preface. It is my earnest desire to attract attention of the educated and wealthy class to the subject of philosophy which is undisputably the Queen of all Studies. In this era of dollar-hunting, people have forgotten the queen, and have fallen in love with her majesty's maid-servants instead. People call mad men as being moon-struck, but it is to be noted that too much devotion to money also makes a man, if not moon-struck, at least money-struck. The words moon and money resemble each other not only in spelling and pronunciation, but also in their intrinsic nature. Money is moony. All money is moonshine. Like the moon, a rich man shines with borrowed light. He owes his dignity, pomp, and grandeur, merely to the glittering of his gold and silver cups. But alas, Through the dignified windows, we see pooh pooh things.

I do not mean to say that rich men should throw away their wealth in the ocean; or that they should treat the glittering coins as scorpions or cobra-eggs. Money gives them power, and with this power at their disposal they can do a lot of good to themselves and to the suffering humanity. What they should avoid is the craze for amassing more money even at the cost of worthier possessions, *e. g.*, health, knowledge, and character. Possess money, and do possess money, but for God's sake, excuse me, for your own sake, for God's sake is your own sake—more of it in a separate booklet—*Do not be possessed by money.*

دولت پہ گھمنڈ ناروا ہے - جم کر پیسہ کہاں ٹکا ہے
پہلے تو یہ دور کر ہے آئی - ہر طرح کا ناچ ہے نیچائی
پہر مار کے لات بھاگ جانا - ہے اسکا اک ادنیٰ سافسانہ

One of the biggest personalities of Gwalior, whose memory shall long be cherished inside as well as outside the State, was Prince Balwant Rao Bhaiya Sahib Scindia. He was a great admirer of learning and lover of simplicity. Many a rich man can overcome the intoxication which money brings with it, if they only care to keep with them, as the late Bhaiya Sahib did, the Talisman of Philosophy. It has very aptly been said of Bhaiya Sahib, that:—

فقر کا جامہ حشمت میں لگا کر پیوند -
دونوں عالم کئے تسخیر بہ زہد و عفت -

15th March, 1928.

V. KAUL.

DANGERS OF PRAGMATISM.

Principal Malkani and Dear Colleagues !

In my today's paper I want to examine critically that doctrine of modern metaphysics which is becoming rampant by the popular name "PRAGMATISM". I will point out that it is no doctrine as a doctrine. The word 'DOCTRINE' is a solemn and sacred word in Philosophy. It means a serious, self-consistent and complete effort to give us an adequate explanation of the eternal metaphysical problems that have vexed humanity ever since the birth of critical thought on our planet. Pragmatism's doctrine is to give up philosophical inquiry as a hopeless task because 'human motives sharpen all our questions; and human satisfactions lurk in all our answers'. It is, therefore, modest and content with taking stock of the expedient truths it has got in store today:—

عاقبت کی خبر خدا جانے
اب تو آرام سے گذرتی ہے

It asks no questions, and offers no solutions, and in this way shows a clean pair of heels to its critics. Pragmatism, in fact, is only another word for opportunism. So much for its doctrine.

Now as for its method, it is only :
 To take the cash in hand and waive the rest ;
 Oh ! the brave music of a distant drum.

Of every hypothesis and theory it asks only one question, on which it prides itself. 'Supposing it is true, what useful consequences to life shall flow from it?' If any useful consequences to our lives flow from it, then the supposition is certified as 'truth', if no consequences then it is kicked out as falsehood. It is in other words Utilitarianism gone mad.

Here I want to point out one particular danger of pragmatism. Pragmatism among philosophical doctrines is like Amar-bel among creepers: a parasite plant. Amar-bel spreads over a tree. It derives all its nourishment from the tree on which it flourishes, having no root of its own. The tree gradually goes on withering on account of this parasite. When the tree has completely dried up and withered beyond all reparation the creeper itself begins to wither and die having lost its source of nourishment from the tree. The same with pragmatism. It has got only its destructive side, but no constructive aspect. It shrewdly avoids to offer any definite solutions and theories of its own regarding the ever-recurring enigma of the world. It contents itself on being work-a-day philosophy; its truth is always in the making, always in the foundry; can never leave the workshop to see the light of the sun and be

tried. If this morbid tendency in contemporary philosophical thought is allowed to thrive, its natural consequence shall be to throttle and gag all the existing theories of philosophy, and thereby indirectly preventing the birth of new ones. Pragmatism, being pragmatism, shall take away all incentive for disinterested search of Truth. There will then remain no motive for untiring philosophical inquiry quite independent of worldly interests. After it has demolished all the strongholds and fortifications wherein philosophy dwells, pragmatism shall die out itself for it has got no philosophy of its own to offer in place of the demolished ones. It is only a method for criticism and destruction of the existent philosophies. As for looking into the full consequential bearings of the new truths discovered by various sciences, the respective sciences are already performing that function, and will continue to perform without needing the assistance of a pragmatic philosophy. Whenever a new truth is discovered by any branch of science, the scientists immediately apply themselves to thrash out the remotest consequences of the new discovery as well as its reactions upon our existing stock of knowledge. A philosophy as a handmaid of science is, therefore, apparently a superfluity. I am on these grounds inclined to think that the pragmatic tendencies in modern philosophical thought are suicidal for philosophy.

I will here confine myself to criticising pragmatism as expounded by one of its best exponents, Prof. W. James of America, in his book named 'Pragmatism', with a view to have a definite plan of criticism before me. I will first give a very brief summary containing only the essential points of each of his lectures separately, and then base my criticism on it.

SUMMARY OF LECTURE I

Two types of mental make up :—

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------|
| <i>A. Tender minded.</i> | <i>B. Tough minded.</i> |
| 1. Rationalistic: going by principles. | 1. Empiricists: going by facts. |
| 2. Intellectualistic. | 2. Sensationalistic. |
| 3. Idealistic or Spiritualistic. | 3. Materialistic. |
| 4. Optimistic. | 4. Pessimistic. |
| 5. Religious. | 5. Irreligious. |
| 6. Free Willist. | 6. Fatalistic. |
| 7. Monistic. | 7. Pluralistic. |
| 8. Dogmatical. | 8. Sceptical. |

There are two prominent schools of thought in philosophy : (1) Hegelians, and other philosophers of the absolutistic type; and (2) Scientific Evolutionists and Agnostics like Herbert Spencer, Martineau and Ladd. W. James himself belongs to this school. Thinkers like Green, Caird, Bosanquet and Royce, belong to the Anglo-Hegelian school.

We want a system that will combine both: the scientific loyalty to facts, and willingness to take account of them with the spirit of adaptation and accommodation; also the old confidence in human values, and the resultant spontaneity whether of the religious or of the romantic type. This is then the Dilemma. We find the two parts hopelessly separated. We find Empiricism with Inhumanism and Irreligion; or else we find a Rationalistic Philosophy, which indeed may call itself religious, but that it keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts, joys and sorrows. To fulfil the want of the people, James offers the oddly named thing, Pragmatism, as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demands. It can remain religious like the rationalism, but at the same time, like the empiricism, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts.

CRITICISM OF LECTURE I

Where there are two types of mental make-up, tender-minded and tough-minded, James has indirectly been led to admit that there is also a third kind of mental make-up, *viz*, melioristic type. Then he observes, rather upholds, that each kind of mental make-up can agree only with the corresponding kind of Philosophy—rationalism for tender minds, empiricism for tough minds, and pragmatism for melioristic minds. Thus pragmatism stands self-condemned at the hands

of pragmatists themselves, and by the very postulate with which they hoped to support it. Just as rationalism loses its claim to be an ultimate metaphysical doctrine, and is reduced to the status of a thing which is suitable and satisfying only to a particular kind of mental make-up, and cannot claim universal validity, because it can not appear reasonable to all, and hence cannot be acceptable to them, in obedience to the inherent natural law of philosophies as implied in James' arguments, 'that each philosophy can be acceptable only to its corresponding kind of mental make-up', we can hold the same of pragmatism as being a doctrine not universally and inherently acceptable to all, but as being only a dish cooked with a special flavour to suit particular temperaments.

Pragmatism pretends to satisfy the conflicting demands. It attempts to reconcile religion with irreligion, but miserably fails. There are facts of nature on one side as observed by us, and on the other side the demands of thought as to what those facts must be, which conclusions we arrive at by our *a priori* reasonings. There is a subtle distinction here. There are two meanings of the verb 'must'; one in the sense of the logical necessity, *a priori* reasoning, the inviolable deductions from the eternal laws of thought; the other significance is couched in the practical and moral

sense of the word 'must'. What *must* be there, that is what must we assume to be there in order that it may expediently serve our purpose, and tolerably explain the situation to us without any glaring inconsistency, but not necessarily carrying the force of a logical *must*. To elucidate further, not denying the possibility of another explanation being given of the same facts, for all eternity. Pragmatism first obtains the acquiescence of its readers in the moral sense of the word 'must', and then quite surreptitiously changes the ground, and having secured the acquiescence of its readers in one sense of the word 'must', uses the same word in the other which is quite different sense. Thus: It *must* be, because it *must* be. The former must here means the logical necessity of its existence, the latter must means its apparent expedience, *viz* the serviceability of the hypothesis in the present situation to take us out of the fix, and to make the whole as understandable to us as it can be at the present stage of our intellect. Here lies the key to the proper understanding of the whole doctrine of pragmatism.

SUMMARY OF LECTURE II

Pragmatic Method.

Here James gives the anecdote of a squirrel, a man, and a tree. A squirrel moves round and round along the trunk of a tree, and the man is running round and

round the tree along with the squirrel clinging to it and moving round it. They both keep moving in the same direction in such a way that the squirrel, the tree and the man are always in one straight line, the belly of the squirrel always facing the man. Two men argue with each other: one says the man has gone round the squirrel because he has circumvented the tree several times to which the squirrel was clinging all along, and the circular path of the squirrel has indisputably been circumscribed by the man's path. The other says that going round the squirrel means facing in succession the animal's belly, side, back, side, and finally belly again. Since the man could not do it, he has failed to go round the squirrel. James offered himself as an arbitrator. He says both can be true. It all depends upon what meaning we attach in practice to the word 'going round'.

The pragmatic method, he says, is simply a method of settling philosophical disputes, that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world One or Many? Fated or Free? Material or Spiritual? Here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world. The disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that were

true? If no practical difference, whatever, can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other being right.

At a glance, the history of the idea of pragmatism will show us still better what pragmatism means. This term is derived from the same Greek word (*pragma*), which means 'action', from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' are derived. It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. He, in his writings somewhere, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, and that to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce. That conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve, what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

Ostwald, the illustrious Liepzig chemist, had been accustomed to put questions to his classes in this way:— "In what respects would the world be different, if this alternative or that were true?" If he could find nothing that could become different, then the alternative had no sense. That is, the rival views mean practically the same thing; and meaning other than practical is for us none. Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude; but it represents it, as it seems to James, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. Against rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragmatism, he says, is fully armed and militant. But at the outset at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas and no doctrines! save its method.

No particular results then, so far; but only an attitude of orientation is, what the pragmatic method means. *The attitude of Looking Away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and of Looking Towards last things, fruits, consequences, and facts.*

So much for the pragmatic method. It shall be presently explained by showing how it works on some familiar problems. Meanwhile, the word Pragmatism has come to be used in a still wider sense, as meaning also a certain 'theory of truth.'

CRITICISM OF LECTURE II

In the summary just given, James has tried so much to prove the importance of the pragmatic method. I would use the words of a man of James' own side in denouncing the pragmatic method. Papini, the king of Italian pragmatists, says: "Pragmatism is less a philosophy than a method of doing without a philosophy," *vide* Schinz's Antipragmatism, page 51. James being a shrewd man, has not, however, been led into such a simple and honest confession. He goes on trying to earn for Pragmatism, the status of a metaphysical theory of truth. But even he at page 57 of his book had to confess at least this much:— "Human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from scientific logic". Pragmatism, in fact, wants us to place ourselves above all logic. Such a desire on the part of a pragmatist is quite consistent with the rest of his principles. It is quite in accord with his nature of seeking the line of expediency and least resistance. But the problem arises in the case of those who find man to be essentially a rational being. How to escape logic? It is impossible to give a dodge to our rational natures, and to ignore the necessity that exists in our thought of testing all thought and experience by discovering certain relations in them, which must exist there if those thoughts and experiences are valid.

The anecdote of the squirrel reminds one of the mathematical puzzles, which the Greek philosopher, Zeno, tried to introduce in Philosophy—the race of a hare and a tortoise, etc. These anecdotes and their solutions, can very well serve the purpose of refreshing talks at dinner tables, but they cannot suffice to give us sound metaphysical theories. I am unshakably of opinion that one inexorable quality of Truth is that it must be free from contradictions. Even in the above example, I am of opinion that the man has gone round the squirrel in the only sense in which going round is possible—I mean the sense in which moon is going round the earth, and earth along with the moon is going round the sun. A's going round B, means A's describing a path which circumscribes B's path, or position if B is fixed. We most frequently speak of the going round of these heavenly bodies, but we never imagine the idea of going round associated with their backs and bellies.

James says on page 51, "Pragmatism does not stand for any special results, but neither does it by any means reject any of them a priori." In other words, it only means that Pragmatism waits and sees which way the wind is blowing. Then takes the side which apparently preponderates, as Italy did in the last German War.

Then again on pages 53 & 54, James says, "It agrees with nominalism for instance, in always appealing

to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions." In other words, it is a confession that it is inconsistent through out. If it accepted the fundamental principle of any one of the aforesaid schools of metaphysics, all the other consequences would have naturally and logically flowed out as they did in that system; and in this way pragmatism would have coincided with that system in its entirety, whichever it would be, say positivism or nominalism, etc.

Swami Ram Tirath once said that were it consistently possible, he would like to be morally a Buddhist, emotionally a Mohammedan, practically a Christian, and intellectually a Vedantist. But the fresh problem that arises, when we consider the aspirations of Pragmatism to belong to half-a-dozen camps of philosophers is this: Whether or not it is possible to belong to various contradictory schools of thought simultaneously? It may be possible from the pragmatic point of view, because their truth, their logicity, and their expediency, all coincide. Their IS and OUGHT TO BE are the same. Their aim and object is to decree truth from the bias which the expediencies of practical life may give them in favour or against a certain belief. They think it is they who v-e-r-i-f-y and v-a-l-i-d-a-t-e a truth. Our principle is different. We believe, and firmly believe,

and rightly believe, that Truth exists eternally, and shines in its own light. It does not beg any tests or verifications of it at our hands in order to become Truth. On the contrary, it is we who need logical examinations of it as well as practical tests of it, in order to become aware of it, at least partially, if not wholly.

Pragmatist's lack of consistency and his attempt to avail of the opposite schools of thought at one and the same time, makes his position not only untenable, but ludicrous to boot; and reminds us of the following line:—

زاهدا تسبیح مبین زناں کا دورا نہ ڈال
یا تو ہندو کیطرف ہو یا مسلمان کیطرف

SUMMARY OF LECTURE III

Pragmatism as a Theory of Truth

Such then would be the scope of Pragmatism; first a method, and secondly a genetic theory of what is meant by Truth; and these two things will be the topic now.

Let us consider some problems of metaphysics pragmatically. The problem of substance, for example. Here is a bit of black-board crayon. Its modes, attributes, properties, accidents or affections—use which

term you like—are whiteness, cylindrical shape, insolubility in water, etc. But the bearer of these attributes is so much *chalk*, which thereupon is called the 'substance' in which they inhere. So the attributes of this desk inhere in the substance 'wood,' those of the coat in the substance 'wool,' and so forth. Chalk, wood, and wool, again show common properties by which they are themselves counted as mode of a still more primal substance, matter, the attributes of which are space occupancy and impenetrability. Similarly, our thoughts and feelings are affections or properties of our several souls, which are substances, but again not wholly in their own right, for they are modes of a still deeper substance 'Spirit.'

A group of attributes is what each substance here is known-as; they form its sole cash-value for actual experience. The substance is revealed through the attributes. If we were cut off from them, we should never suspect its existence, *i. e.*, of the substance. If God should keep sending them to us in an unchanged order, miraculously annihilating at a certain moment the substance that supported them, we never could detect the moment, for our experiences themselves would be unaltered. Nominalists, accordingly adopt the opinion that 'substance' is a spurious idea due to our inveterate human trick of turning names into things. Phenomena come in groups—the chalk-group, the wood-group,

etc—— and each group gets its name. The name we then treat as in a way supporting the group of phenomena. The phenomenal properties of things do not inhere in names, and also then not inhere in any thing. They *adhere* or *cohere* rather with each other; and the notion of a substance inaccessible to us must be abandoned. The fact of the bare cohesion itself is all that the notion of the 'substance' signifies. Behind that fact is nothing.

CRITICISM OF LECTURE III

Critical philosophy cannot be satisfied with the sort of explanation given in the foregoing paragraphs. It is a patched-up sort of reconciliation between two antagonistic and irreconcilable camps of philosophers. It ignores the fundamental necessity of thought. A thing either is or is not. It can not *be* and *not be* at the same time.

Moreover, it is said that if God should continue to send us phenomena, miraculously annihilating at any moment the substance which supported the properties, we could never suspect its existence. That is all right. But if we do not understand any thing, it is no reason that we should not constantly go on trying to understand it, undaunted by our past failures, and unaffrighted by the difficulty of the problem in hand.

We are not in eager haste, let us freely confess, to coincide philosophy with common sense. Philosophy has always been a rare sense, and shall continue to be so. It has always been the favourite pursuit of the gifted and philosophically minded few. Those alone can faithfully continue the pursuit of philosophy, who have realized the charms of thinking for thinking's sake.

We have already seen how things degenerate if people become over-enthusiastic about making their particular pursuit popular. We have had popular science, popular art, popular theology. Only one thing was lacking: popular philosophy. Pragmatism gives that to us.

Nominalists, Positivists, Solipsists, are all true and consistent to their own respective view-points. If incredible and odd deductions can be made from their respective theories, they are only the ultimate logical consequences of the ground they have once taken. But they do not constantly go on shifting their ground through out their theory like a vibrating shuttle.

In this Lecture of his Pragmatism, James disposes of the idea of God as pragmatically to be acquiesced in, because it lends us a faith in the eternal preservation of our ideals and moral values, which becomes inadmissible if we adopt the materialistic theory, that the ultimate result of the Universe is a complete dissipation of matter and energy.

Again in the course of the same lecture, discussing Free Will versus Determinism, he says that "The real ground for supposing Free Will is, indeed, pragmatic; but it has nothing to do with this contemptible right to punish, which has made such a noise in past discussions of the subject." It is apparent from his foregoing arguments that he accepts Free Will not because he has found it to be ultimately the truth, but because such a position is expedient and serves the needs of everyday life without dragging us into philosophical controversies. A pragmatist's only look-out is to hide himself in a niche, a corner, a retreat, to save himself from the attacks and oppositions of real philosophers, who can not blink at genuine contradictions, and who cannot conscientiously sink themselves into the plausible attitude of a pragmatist.

A pragmatist is not fired with the zeal and enthusiasm to discover the real truth instead of working hypothesis, whatever *Truth* may cost, and whether it is discoverable within one's life-time or not. He is busy in mincing matters, and reconciling theories, howsoever irreconcilable and contradictory of each other they may be. Whenever we have to face a proposition which is *prima facie* an anomaly, or otherwise is imbued with germs of self-contradiction, we must not ignore it in our desire, though well-intentioned, to discover a mediate path: a reconciliatory position.

As for pragmatist's anxiety to be utilitarian in the immediate present lest the world around us may come to a stand still in the face of a philosophical controversy, all action and life might stop unless we come to their rescue with working formulas in philosophy, I dare say that his anxiety is groundless. The world is not born today. She is of sufficient age. She has by this time acquired a sufficient store of working formulas, which can guide and are guiding her millions, though roughly, yet pretty approximately on the path of action, life, success, and virtue. A philosopher is not to live for today. He lives for tomorrow. He must be above the desires of public applause and immediate recognition of his work by the multitudes who scoff at philosophers, and shall continue to do so.

His quest for truth must be eternal in spirit; I mean such as if he were to live for ever. The pragmatic attitude does not satisfy a genuinely philosophic mind. I for one, am not for any particular school of metaphysics; but I must confess, that a metaphysics, whether it may be existent or be discovered many years hence, must satisfy what the Intellect demands of it. For example, taking the doctrine of Ahimsa, a philosopher must take up one of the following positions:—

1. It is a sin to kill animals.

Or

2. *It is not* a sin to kill animals.

Or

3. *Animals may be killed under such and such circumstances* without incurring a sin. Under all other circumstances, it is a sin to kill them.

A theory which says that it is sinful for Jains to kill animals, and virtuous for Europeans to shoot at them because it gives them sport, does not satisfy the intellect. One must be faithful at least to the three inviolable fundamental laws of logic; *viz*, (1) The law of affirmation; (2) The law of contradiction; and (3) The law of the excluded middle.

James despises inquiries into the principle of punishment, just as so many moralists have discussed as to what right we have of punishing a criminal. Do we punish him because we want to correct and educate him for his own benefit? or do we punish him to set an example to the rest, his punishment to act as a deterrent to others from indulging in crime? Or do we confine him only to prevent further injuries occurring to Society from that individual, who has once proved by his actions that he is dangerous? and that his freedom is not free from risk to Society. Such discussions possess a perennial interest and importance for Moralists and inquirers into the principles of

legislation. James takes away the ground from underneath our feet by calling an inquiry into the right to punish as contemptible right to punish. Pragmatists must be told that philosophy consists in nothing else but an inquiry into the ultimate principles, rights and foundations of everything. As for serving the purposes of practical philosophy in everyday life, a study of law, politics, and economics, together with common sense, can fairly suffice to guide us in the conduct of our daily lives.

SUMMARY OF LECTURE IV

The Problem of the One and the Many.

Pragmatism, pending the final ascertainment of just what the balance of union (One) and disunion (Many) among things may be, must obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side. Some day, she admits, even total union with one knower, one origin, and a universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses. Meanwhile, the opposite hypothesis of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to remain so, must be sincerely entertained. This latter hypothesis is Pluralism's doctrine. It is clear that Pragmatism must turn its back on absolute Monism, and follow pluralism's more empirical path.

CRITICISM OF LECTURE IV

I cannot understand why pragmatism should be in such a great hurry to jump at conclusions at the cost of certainty, as if it were raining hard, and we needed some shelter very badly. Pragmatist says, the world may ultimately prove itself to be a perfect unity. He does not deny the possibility. On the other hand, he hastens to believe the world to be constituted of many, shrewdly taking care not to commit himself one way or the other. He says, "Let us wait and see which way the wind is blowing (or is favourable)." He is like a weather-cock, a time server.

A pragmatist seems to be under the illusion as if all the work of the world, the mills, foundries, railways, canals and bridges, are held in suspense pending the issue of Idealistic and Empiricist philosophies. Therefore pragmatism runs with her oddly-patched philosophy for their rescue. The situation is far from being like this. A solipsist or a vedantist, even though their ultimate notion of truth is, what can be poetically expressed by the following line :

ہے فلک اپنی ہی آہون کا دھوان

behave like ordinary men. They punctually take their baths, and eat three meals a day ; and do the rest of their business like everybody else, irrespective of what their metaphysical doctrine about the reality of

the world is. Whether water is H_2O , two atoms of hydrogen combining with one atom of oxygen to form one molecule of water, and exists as eternal matter independent of the spirit, or it is only a copy of the archtypical idea of water existing only in our awareness of it, does not prevent them from their ordinary round of duties.

A pragmatist shall contend that believing one way or the other, shall reflect upon their outlook on life, and this may be treated as a difference of practical significance. I can only illustrate it like this. One man is sitting in a chair and thoughts are rapidly passing in his mind, which fact is reflected partially in the contours of his face. The same man is found sitting some other time when thoughts are passing very slowly in his mind, and he has much less ruffled contours of his face. Now an idealist would take it like this. That thought qua thought, being on both occasions only examples of the same basic category 'thought,' is the same in the two instances. While the thought on two occasions can be differentiated as regards the contents of thought on either occasion, as well as in respect of its mode of duration and succession. A pragmatist, however, would probably distinguish between the thoughts on two occasions in as much as they gave rise to different kinds of contours on the thinker's face, or from some other practical reactions. Their outlook is

quite unphilosophical. An idealist says that if contours were different on either occasions, they may be explained by rules known as physiological laws. Metaphysics is a study of the pure substance known as 'thought,' and thought's inviolable laws. The essential difference between the facial expressions on two occasions and the essential difference between the thoughts on two occasions has not much to do for a student of metaphysics, which is not a study of practical utilities in the world, but of ultimate truths, realities, and beauties and necessities. The facial expressions, from the point of view of a student of idealistic metaphysics, were only an incidence even though the word incidence may have to be lengthened by the adjectival phrase, 'inseparably corresponding incidences', or pre-arranged harmony between thought and expression, as expounded by Leibnitz in his *Monadology*.

In short, the essential nature of thought, is quite different from, and even independent of the physical facts and events around us.

In Lecture IV, James himself is inclined to admit that pragmatic method does not ascertain the truth. It only attempts to find out such hypotheses and explanations of the phenomena of the world as might lend a colour of promise and hopefulness to the world's future. To repeat his own words :—" Be they false or be they true, the meaning of them is this meliorism."

No sooner a new truth is discovered, we quite naturally and humanly try to assimilate it, to reconcile it with and graft it upon our existing stock of truth. We immediately try to utilize it in our life, and discover as to what bearing, and to what extent, it shall have upon our practical affairs. Simply stated, it means that all truths are utilized, but it does not mean that it is the utility or the practical significance of it alone, which constitutes its essence, or makes a truth 'a truth'. Its *utility* does not determine its *truthness*. Truth is truth because it is truth; though it can not be denied that its practical significance is what concerns us most closely in our lives, as we are practical beings, having rights and responsibilities, and are not *Muktas* (liberated souls), who exist only and absolutely.

On page 158 of *Pragmatism*, Professor James says: "If our minds should ever become *telepathically* connected, so that we knew immediately, each what the other was thinking, the world we now live in would appear to the thinkers in that world to have been of an inferior grade". It is inferior in that sense already to Hindu Mahatmas and Yogis, who have got telepathic powers, and hence their disgust of the world and the common run of worldly people, who are as if they were dancing with masks on, in a Zoo Ball at Cornaglia's or Rose Coy's in Bombay. Even *viveki purushas*, i. e., men of discrimination and clear thoughts though not

possessing telepathic powers or spiritual vision can, through their knowledge and experience, realize this. They may not know an individual case, but they have an approximate idea as to what the common people of the world are like—merely trained bipeds, yet full of selfishness, and the ape and baboon and the bear still lurking in them. Nietzsche knew them well, when he wrote his book "Zarathushtra". In our own times, Bernard Shaw has given us unmistakable proofs in his writings that he understands what they are. So a *viveki purusha* though unable to say exactly who is who behind the masks, as the Yogis do know, is on the whole well aware of the situation, and takes the world only for what it is worth—a gymnasium to train ourselves in, to acquire good habits, and to form character.

But if we take the word Inferior used in James' lines reproduced above, in any other sense, the meaning shall become absurd. If we mean that this world is inferior to another world that we can create in imagination, I challenge that such an imagination is an impossibility. This world is as perfect as it could be. Though a poet tauntingly says :—

تقا ضائے تصور ہے کہ یہ دنیاے گوناگون
پسند آئے نہ تمکو تو بنالو دوسری دنیا

That is, if you do not like this world, make another one of your own, according to your plan and suiting your taste. But the subtle joke hidden here is that to say nothing of making another world, we cannot even think of it in imagination. So if we call this world inferior in the comparative sense, the word Inferior etymologically being comparative adjective, the question would arise 'this world is inferior to what?' This is the only world we are aware of, that we know of, and that we can think of. It is as it is; and it is it unalterably.

As for the existence of sin in this world, an objection most commonly raised, I should say this is the essential nature of the world. World would not be world, if there were no evil in it; and virtue would cease to be virtue if there were no vice in existence with which it could be contrasted. We must judge the world as world, a school as a school. If we do not find ice-caps or fracture-beds in a school, we can not call it insufficiently or improperly furnished, for it is a school and not a hospital. The essential furniture for a world is *Good* and *Evil*, *Sin* and *Virtue*, *Hope* and *Fear* (*ایم ورجا*) etc.; and with these pairs of opposites the world is ever since its beginning duly furnished.

SUMMARY OF LECTURES V & VI

The Pragmatic Notion of Truth.

Absolute truth can not be claimed by any one of the three ways of understanding reality:—*viz.*, (1) Common sense; (2) Science; (3) Philosophy. Consequently the conception of truth must be revised.

Truth exists in the plural. Truths are successful ways of handling experience (*Denkmittels*). Apart from verification in experience, truth has neither value nor existence. A truth is a successful belief, where success is judged in practice. Truth is made by experience; and also makes experience, *i. e.*, brings new facts to light.

Rationalistic conception of truth is an abstraction, when made independent over against experience. Unconditional or absolute truth presupposes absolute experience, and if at all possible of attainment, must come at the End.

 CRITICISM OF LECTURES V & VI

Truth about anything must always be in the singular. To say that truths exist in the plural, for truths are capable of being improved and revised from time to time, is self-contradictory and a repugnant idea. A truth in order to be truth must first be discerned as such intellectually, and then subsequently it may filter

down to the domain of pragmatic truth. To say that truth is true first pragmatically, and then so intellectually is like putting a cart before the horse. It is said that truth is the name of successful beliefs. It is apparently futile to quarrel over the arrangement of words in this definition. They are only the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Beliefs are successful in as much as they are faithful copies of truth, and they are hurtful and failures in as much as they disagree with truth.

James himself says on pages 216 and 217, that we must have a theory that 'works' with no capricious logic; a theory "*must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible? And it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To "work" means both these things: and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any Hypothesis. (Our theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is.*" In other words, by his own confession, James delivers pragmatism bound hand and foot for execution at the hands of intellectualism.

In Lecture V, James by shifting the conception of God from Absolute to Ultimate, saves himself the labour as also the possibility of criticism incurred in offering a conception of God; because as Ultimate, it is yet to come, it has yet to be. We cannot foresee as to what it shall be, because it is yet in the making.

On page 188, he denounces wholesale Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hegel and Kant, because they have not given us any scientific invention. It would be as just to denounce Marconi and Edison for not having given us a moral philosophy and metaphysics. When in spite of such Fathers of Philosophy, who did so much to rationalise and moralise humanity, we find the world what it is, we can scarcely imagine what would have been to-day the fate of dollar-hunting and invention-loving population of the world. Every new discovery in the field of science tends to subvert a nation's prevailing moral code and notions about religion, by puffing them with their apparent victory over nature. Philosophy does a great service by explaining anew and over to us again in the light of new facts, the need for religion and morality.

Some time ago, many astrologers predicted that the world shall cease to exist on such and such date by colliding with a comet or similar other reason. A certain astrologer of Rajputana announced in the papers that all those astrologers who had prophesied the annihilation of the world were wrong, and challengingly declared that the world would continue to exist. This Rajputana astrologer was a fast friend of a relation of mine. My relation asked him as to how he could be so bold and insistent in his statement that the world would not be destroyed, when a large number of European as

well as Indian astrologers were unanimous in their mathematical calculations, as well as astrological conclusions based thereon, who held the opposite view. He confided his secret to my relation, and said that if the world did not disappear on that date, his word would be honoured by all ; and if our planet did come to grief on that date, then apparently there would remain no one alive to find fault with his prophecy. So he pointed out to his friend that he had taken up a position which was quite safe under either circumstance.

A pragmatist takes up a more or less similarly advantageous position. Take an illustration. Suppose a pragmatist takes $x + y = w$, and an idealist finds $x + y = z$. Now reason demands that either w and z must be equal to each other, in which case it is useless and absurd to give them two denominations: w and z when they both have identically one and the same value; or if w is not equal to z , then one of the two (idealist and pragmatist) is wrong. A pragmatist says that $x + y$ may be ideally or rationally equal to z , but if his taking $x + y$ equivalent to w , does not make any difference of sufficient magnitude as to be cognisable from the practical point of view in this work-a-day world, not only there is not the least harm in his taking $x + y = w$, but also that he is at liberty to take the value of $x + y$ as being equivalent to w , eternally and permanently. It is on this point that I

beg to differ from him. He knows that he is quite safe in his entrenched position because it is not practically possible for men of the opposite camp to prove his position to be false, when a priori reasoning has been declared inadmissible by him, without at the same time proving what difference it would make in practical life to take $x + y = w$ or $= z$.

I say that $x + y$ is really and ultimately equal to z , and a thing which is equal to z , can never be equal to w , when w is not equal to z . It is another thing altogether that the present stage of civilization and inventions which we have reached is such that it may make no appreciable difference whether we take $x + y = w$ or $= z$, for all practical purposes. Or in other words, the difference between w and z is so small considering its bearing on practical life viewed from the present level of our intellectual advancement, that it may be considered negligible for all practical purposes.

But this gives rise to another very interesting point: the boundary line or the frame work of philosophy in contradistinction to its contents. Intellectual advancement or no advancement, primary stage or a very advanced stage, there is a certain fixed frame work for human mind, within which alone it can move. These set lines, which give us the necessities and postulates of thought, are known to us by a more popular heading: Limitations to Human Reason.

But this is the situation today. Tomorrow a new situation may arise, and it may make difference in its practical consequences to take $x + y = w$ and not $= z$, etc. Future is fraught with infinite possibilities except one: the true Truth cannot be false tomorrow. The true Truth is distinguished from the pragmatic truth, which is always in the making, is the same in the past, present, as well as in the future. In short there is no past and future for it. It is eternal truth. It is not the pragmatic truth, which means only a hypothesis after all, howsoever serviceable, useful and expedient it might be. As a hypothesis, it is liable to change, alteration and amendment, *prima facie*.

I take it, the possibility may be a very remote one, so much so that one might feel tempted to call it an impossible possibility. Nonetheless, it is there. And the human intellect of the highest order, a distinguishing trait of which is an insatiable or in-inhibitable interest in the disinterested pursuit of Truth, must take even such a remote possibility into account. Some philosopher has very beautifully said:— "If I held Truth in my left hand, I would rather let it go for the pleasures of pursuing it again". Minds of the highest and most sacred type alone should take to the study of philosophy. People with pragmatic bent of mind ought to go to business, where they can make

millions. They suit the business world quite. Their ideal is 'expediency'.

We can, however, never be won over to their side by the bait of Expediency, which they offer to us. Men like Edison, who, Sir P. C. Ray said in his address at the last Convocation (i. e., 1926) of the Mysore University, would not give a penny for a University graduate, are not the sort of men who would study philosophy, or patronize its study by others. It is men like Shri Pratap Seth of Amalner who has been spending lakhs of rupees over the Indian Institute of Philosophy, only to keep the torch of philosophy burning, and who takes a pure and personal interest in the disinterested search of Truth and discussion of Ideals, who can be called fit for studying it, or patronizing its study.

Men like Edison and Henry Ford measure a man's value from the quantity of goods he can manufacture per hour. Their brains are scaled with different scale values. The denomination of value in terms of which they measure the values of all things is pound, shilling, and pence. It is men like them who accuse philosophy, and say: "Philosophy bakes no bread". Yes, philosophy *bakes no bread*; but philosophy *makes every man*.

If there is no man in a man, it is no use feeding the animal in him, and baking bread for the brutes, who think that *they live by bread alone*. One rises or falls

by one's philosophy, not necessarily from the point of view of material prosperity in the world, but in his own estimation which is the chief thing. One may be honoured by the whole world but if in his own heart of hearts, he finds himself hateworthy, a loathsome, selfish, flattering animal, he can never be blessed with peace happiness and bliss in his mind.

SUMMARY OF LECTURE VII

Pragmatism and Humanism.

Laws and languages at any rate are thus seen to be man-made things. Mr. Schiller applies the analogy to beliefs, and proposes the name of "Humanism" for the doctrine, that to a certain unascertainable extent, our truths are man-made products too. Human motives sharpen all our questions. Human satisfactions lurk in all our answers—all our formulas have a human twist.

The most famous doctrine of Protagoras, 'Homo mensura' is that man is the measure of all things. The doctrine is much developed in modern times, and is known as Humanism. As a matter of fact, Pragmatism has its source in this doctrine.

Our sensations and their relations between themselves are REAL. The previous truths of which every new inquiry takes account, are also real. Now, however fixed, these elements of reality may be, we still have a

certain freedom in our dealings with them. Take our sensations. That they are, is undoubtedly beyond our control, but which we attend to, note and make emphatic in our conclusions, depends upon our own interests; and according as we lay the emphasis here or there, quite different formulations of truth result. We read the same facts differently. 'Waterloo' with the same fixed details, spells a 'victory' for an Englishman, for a French a 'defeat'. So, for an optimistic philosopher, the Universe spells 'victory', for a pessimist 'defeat'.

The import of the difference between Pragmatism and Rationalism, is now in sight through out its whole extent. The essential contrast is that for Rationalism, *reality* is ready-made and complete from all eternity; while for Pragmatism, it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future. On the one side the Universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its adventures.

The alternative between pragmatism and rationalism in the shape in which we now have it before us, is no longer a question in the theory of knowledge only; it concerns the structure of the Universe itself.

Pragmatism cannot join the tough minds in rejecting the whole notion of a world beyond finite experience.

It defends rationalistic hypothesis, so far as these redirect us fruitfully into experience.

Pragmatism had all along been offering itself as a Mediator between tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness.

CRITICISM OF LECTURE VII

From pragmatic standpoint it means that steam had no power nor the latent possibility in it of the utilization of that power, before the advent of its discovery by George Stephenson. Rationalists believe that all the truths about steam, its nature, and possibilities of its utilization existed from eternity. That they were discovered by George Stephenson, is only an incident in the world's history. Even if it had failed to be discovered by George Stephenson and all men born in the world subsequent to him, truth would have remained all the same. It could have made no material difference to truth *as such*. We are not prepared to admit that sun was revolving round the earth till the advent of Galileo, and after his discovery of the real astronomical relations, the earth began to revolve round the sun. It goes without saying, which of the two views is more rational and commending to our faith—pragmatistic or rationalistic.

We always use the word 'discovery' in connexion with truths, and not 'invention'. We can not decree or invent them. By only some lucky incident, we happen to remove the veil or cover of our ignorance from it, and Truth is 'discovered'. It shines forth to us with teeming effulgence of light and glory, and invincibility. The pragmatic objection against us tantamounts to this. Why can we not discover the truth in advance of its discovery? It is a meaningless and self-contradictory statement. Whether the discovery of 'truth' about the ultimate principles of universe in advance, is possible or not, without actually coming to that end of time, we do not consider. The postulate of our philosophy is not, that truth is only that much which is known to us, the rest is all in the making, truth lying incomplete and unmanufactured in the Factory of Future. That would, indeed, be a very sickly attitude for a student of philosophy. It would take away that healthy feeling, which one has when he thinks that he must reclaim and snatch as much as possible from the infinite and unknown sea of truth. Thus it would appear that even on pragmatic (*i. e.*, practical) considerations, the doctrine of rationalism is more defensible.

'SUMMARY OF LECTURE VIII Pragmatism and Religion.

Tough-mindedness positively rejects tender-mindedness, *i. e.*, the hypothesis of an eternal, perfect edition of the Universe, co-existing with our finite experience. On pragmatic principles, we cannot reject any hypothesis, if consequences useful to life flow from it.

Well the use of the Absolute is proved by the whole course of men's religious history. The eternal arms are then beneath. Remember Vivekananda's use of the Atman; not, indeed, a scientific use, for we can make no particular deductions from it. It is emotional and spiritual altogether.

There are unhappy men, who think salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as Pessimism. Optimism, in turn, would then be the doctrine of thinking the world's salvation inevitable.

Midway between the two, there stands what may be called the doctrine of Meliorism, though it has hitherto figured less as a doctrine than as an attitude in human affairs. It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards Meliorism.

We see concretely two types of religion in sharp contrast. Using our old terms of comparison, we may

say that the Absolutistic scheme appeals to the tender-minded, while the pluralistic scheme appeals to the tough-minded.

Many persons would refuse to call the pluralistic scheme religious at all. They would call it moralistic, and apply the word 'religious' to the monistic scheme alone. Religion in the sense of self-surrender, and moralism in the sense of self-sufficingness, have been pitted against each other as incompatibles frequently enough in the history of human thought.

We stand here before the final question of philosophy. James said in his 4th lecture that he believed the *monistic-pluralistic alternative* to be the deepest and most pregnant question that our minds can frame. But pluralism and monism are genuine incompatibles. He could not start upon a whole theology at the end of this last lecture, but when he tells us that he has written a book on men's religious experiences, which on the whole has been regarded as making for the reality of God, we will perhaps exempt his own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. He says, he firmly disbelieves himself that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the Universe. We are tangent to the wider life of things. But just as many of the dog's and cat's ideals coincide with our ideals, and dogs and cats have daily living proofs of

the fact, so we may well believe on the proofs that religious experience affords, that higher powers exist, and are at work to save the world on ideal lines similar to our own.

You see that Pragmatism can be called religious, if you allow that religion can be pluralistic or merely melioristic in type. But whether you will finally put up with that type of religion or not, is a question that only you yourself can decide. Pragmatism has to postpone dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in the long run.

But if you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and radical sense, but *mixed* as most of us are, it may seem to you that the type of pluralistic and moralistic religion that he has offered, is as good a religious synthesis as you are likely to find. Between the two extremes of crude Naturalism on the one hand and Transcendental Absolutism on the other, you may find that, what he takes the liberty of calling the pragmatistic or melioristic type of theism, is exactly what you require.

CRITICISM OF LECTURE VIII

We believe a thing because we believe it, not because we must believe it, that is in the sense of moral 'ought'

or because pragmatism shows us that consequences useful to life would flow if we believed it. If there is perfect liberty anywhere, it is in the domain of thought. There is a thorough-going democracy, an absolute republic in the world of our knowledge and convictions. To believe and to know is synonymous. We believe a thing because we know it as such. Half-hearted beliefs as people have sometime to experience in matters religious, are guesses and conjectures rather than beliefs, and come under the pale of Doubts and not Beliefs. We can control our actions due to external sanction of morality, *viz.*, fear; or due to internal sanction of morality, *viz.*, considerations of utility, consequences useful to life flowing from it. But we can not control or bribe our thoughts and beliefs and persuade them to be framed in particular moulds, because consequences useful to life will flow from doing so. In fact we are unable to prevent them from soaring as high and probing as deep as they like, and they retain the result of their researches. A case of voluntarily effacing something from our memory is a psychological impossibility. Here I am reminded of an anecdote. A Sadhu on being teased and pinched to teach the mode of turning iron into gold, gave out to his obstinate disciple that he may heat any piece of iron in a furnace, and when it has become red-hot all that he has to do in order to change it into gold, is to

sprinkle a little powdered copper-sulphate on it, and it shall instantaneously become a lump of glittering gold. But one precaution is necessary. While sprinkling copper-sulphate he must not think of a monkey. The disciple made thousands of attempts to make gold, but he was always invariably reminded of the monkey; and could never succeed in getting himself rid of this idea. It is a plain psychological trick which everybody knows. Similarly, I mean to point out that if we know a thing one way, we cannot believe it the other way, because of pragmatic or utilitarian considerations. Optimism may be the doctrine of thinking the world's salvation inevitable, and meliorism may be the doctrine of thinking the world's salvation to be possible as well as impossible, but if the noetic and emotional trend of our mind, makes us pessimists, we cannot be otherwise.

Pluralistic religion is not religion at all. 'Re' means again, and 'ligo' means to bind. Religion is the name given to that body of beliefs and the consequent practices, which connect us with the Absolute, which is original as well as the ultimate reality, in fact the only Reality, and fountain head of all realities. Pragmatic doctrine of pluralism can only lead us to moralism. Moralism implies self-sufficingness. Religion means complete self-surrender.

"Let Thy will be done, O Lord!"

راضی ہیں ہم اسی میں جسمین تری رضا ہو

If there is a perfect devotee of God, he prays like this:—

“O God! If it be Thy will to throw me into hell with all its tortures for eternity, the very hell is heaven to me, because I love Thee, and I go there to carry out the will of my Beloved, which is such a pleasurable task.”

طاعت میں تارھے نہ مے و انگبین کی لاگ
دوزخ میں ڈال دو کوئی لیکر بہشت کو
(غالب)

James says that Absolutistic Monism is equally insupportable from the facts in our experience of this world. Therefore by way of solution for this impasse in the field of religion, he suggests to us the monistic-pluralistic-alternative. It is neither theism nor atheism, but a sort of luke-warm religion. A follower of such a religion would I think have to pray in something like the following words:—

O God! If You be there, I pray to Thee, and bow before Thee, and ask Thy pardon for my digressions from the path of virtue, else let this prayer of mine be treated as withdrawn.

It reminds me of a seeker after employment, who wrote out an application, enclosed it in a cover, and addressed the cover:—“To, anybody requiring the

services of a matriculate clerk.” He posted the cover Now tell me who this cover was intended for.

Such people forget that Faith is the chief ingredient of religion, and not Doubt. For faith, we have to bathe in the Ganges of Idealism, and have to go by principles. If we go by facts, and besmear ourselves over with the sand of pragmatism, we must not forget that we have not had the refreshing bath in the Ganges, and should not pretend to have been annointed with religion.

James says, his pragmatism should not be suspected of atheism, because he has written a book named “Varieties of Religious Experiences,” which is said to have on the whole made for the reality of God. I have read that book from cover to cover. In that he has mostly copied extracts from people’s letters and autobiographies, and has narrated hallucinations etc. He has through out the book scrupulously avoided to give explanations of such religious phenomena, and he has carefully reserved his opinion on these topics. A reader on finishing the book has no suggestions before him. The author has been neither dogmatic nor critical. He has through out his progress with the book, clung to the rock of safety and silence.

The essential point that I find in this book is, that a ‘prayerful’ state of mind opens the doors of some chamber.

We do not know exactly, which it is—either Unconscious level, or Sub-conscious level, or some physiological reactions. At any rate a vast store of energy in the shape of self-confidence, perseverance, hopefulness, etc., comes out of these doors, which generally tends to tone and improve men's actions and lives in this world.

It is quite all right for James, as a first class psychologist to opine and explain in this way the attitude of a praying person (prayerer), and the subsequent benefits that accrue to him. But the question is whether a man who is in this attitude of examining the phenomenon of prayer from scientific and pragmatist's point of view, can himself pray devoutly or not. I am of opinion that unless a man is a firm believer in God, he cannot pray, in that sense of the word, in which alone a prayer is a prayer.

Then he says that we can believe in the existence of higher powers, just as dogs and cats can believe in our existence. But there is an essential difference. Dogs and cats find an ocular proof of our existence. We can at best only have inferential proofs of the existence of higher powers. With dogs and cats, we have animal life in common. With higher powers we have quite a different life in common, *viz.*, rational and spiritual. Our ideals do not coincide with those of dogs and cats.

Of course we eat and drink and sleep as they do, because we hold animal nature in common. But we

are rational beings, and hence we do not eat and drink and sleep as they do. We have quite different ideals, outlooks, and significances. We observe fasts and vigils. They do not and cannot. We eat to live, they live to eat.

خوردن برائے زیستن و ذکر کردنست
تو معتقد که زیستن از بهر خوردن است

GENERAL CRITICISM

Pragmatism, nonetheless, cannot be denied the right to exist as a line of deceptive argument, as a mode of dissension in philosophy. As such it has had a history. It may have occurred for the first time to Mr. Charles Pierce in 1878, or to Prof. James in 1906, but it was known to our ancestors in India thousands of years ago. To support my statement, I would quote the following extracts from Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy.

(a) "If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture, we might say that, that alone is truth in accordance with which we may realise our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunction is shown by the practical attainment of our objects. Truth cannot be determined a priori, but depends upon the test of experience". (P. 209)

(b) "Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect".

To ancient Buddhist India, the doctrine was known as '*Arthakriyakaritva*'.

If in a newspaper, a certain news is such that can not affect me one way or the other, then from the pragmatic test of truth it is alike to me as truth as well as falsehood. But just as news do not cease to be news, so truth cannot cease to be a truth irrespective of its bearing or fruitfulness for me.

Philosophy means a disinterested search of the absolute truth for its own sake. A commercial philosophy, or the philosophy of the expedient is a misnomer. It amounts to deposing Philosophy, the queen of all studies, from her high throne. I agree with pragmatism, truth shall be verified at the end, *i. e.*, ultimately; but we want to know it beforehand, pending its verification. We want to forecast it. Even approximate calculations of truth or guesses at it, it is better to have them rather than to give up the quest of eternal truth altogether, and confine ourselves to every day working formulas, and content ourselves with the ever-changing stock of pragmatic truths only, which are always in the melting pot. This can be the only genuine philosophic attitude.

I should not be suspected of being a pragmatist in my support of Idealism, because I am a stipendiary of the Amalner Philosophic Institute, the Founder and Superintendent of which are Vedantists, a kind of idealism. My personal convictions are anti-pragmatic. Being a Hindu Brahmin, it is highly improbable for me to go to the pragmatistic camp, when even Christians and Mohammedans are gradually coming over to our side—the followers of the Bible and the Koran respectively, which say that God created the Universe only some 7000 years back, after working hard for six days, he took rest on Sunday. Originally their philosophies imply beyond doubt, pluralism, pragmatism and materialism. Their sex-urge continues even after their emancipation or Nirvana, for they require 100 houries and 100 gulmans each for their carnal indulgences and satisfactions. It did not occur to them that if these mundane passions persisted even after death, and if we were not indemnified against susceptibilities to these sorts of loathsome excitements, emancipation would have been no emancipation at all. But now we see clearly the kindlings of rationalistic and idealistic thought among them. From Christians, I would name Bishop Berkeley himself. From Mohammedans, to name only one, I would say Galib, though there are many illustrious names like Moulana Jalal Uddin Rumi author of Masnavi Sharif, Shamse-Tabrez, Shah Mansoor, etc.

Galib says :—

ہستی کے سب فریب میں آ جائیو اسد
عالم تمام حلقہ دام خیال ہے

O Galib ! Do not be deceived by the big and pompous words : Existence, Facts. Know that the whole Universe is only a trick of thought.

Where are the practical significances, the utilities, and consequences flowing useful to life, in this sphere, which are the sole tests of truth to a pragmatist, except that it is a new sphere altogether, incomprehensible and inaccessible to a pragmatist, being scaled with different kind of values. Nay the fundamental notion of value itself is transcended here. All the pragmatic utilities and values are hurled down head over heels into vacuity, when one reaches this high level of an intellectualist. This is a supreme and transcendental interpretation of existence, truth and reality, by an idealist.

Another grand line of Galib :—

کیا تگ ہم ستم زدگان کا جہان ہے
جسمین کہ ایک بیضہ مور آسمان ہے

How narrow does the Universe appear to us, we poor people, who are suffering at the hands of vastness of our thought, in as much as the whole expanse of the sky seems no bigger to us than a single egg of an ant.

God was one. He became many to fulfil himself. Ultimately it shall all become one again, and to discerning eyes, it is all one even now.

एकोऽहम् बहु स्याम् :

Some Persian saint meant the same when he said :—

این ہم صورت برون آرد ازان بی صورتی

All these shapes have come out of that infinite sea of shapelessness.

Consciousness has a child named thought. Thought is wonderfully powerful. It scans the heavens. It strides from star to star, till at last thought transcends itself and merges in and coincides with consciousness, the only and eternal reality.

On pragmatic principles, we may believe $4 + 3 = 8$, when we are a creditor ; and $4 + 3 = 6$, when we are a debtor, because it is expedient in either case. But how can this ever be ? It is an absurdity and an illogicality. Dr. Dasgupta has said in his famous book, History of Indian Philosophy, page 369, that 'no construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought.'

Pragmatism or meliorism, is a half-way philosophy. It is very praiseworthy, indeed, to have such an attitude of mind as James has : to wish and sincerely to

attempt to reconcile the conflicting and enigmatic and most puzzling philosophies of the world. I desire as much as James for the success of Pragmatism ; but the question arises whether it is possible for such a creed to stand. Has it got any legs to stand upon ? Or by merely believing that what we wish to be there is there, we are practising self-deception. After the first glamour is over, and we associate ourselves closely with the doctrine of pragmatism, we find on examination that such a luke-warm philosophy is an illogicality, a fraud and a sham, incapable of satisfying rational thought.

The world is like the Riddle of the Sphinx. Solve the riddle or be devoured by the Sphinx. No half way houses. Be on this side or on that. You cannot build and live in the mid-stream. Everybody is carrying his philosophy, consciously or unconsciously. Without a philosophy of life, a man is like a ship sailing without an anchor. We must, therefore, be keen on this point, and decide quickly whether to be a pragmatist or anti-pragmatist.

Let us take James' own analogy of temperaments—tough-minded, tender-minded, and the melioristic type. If we take up this position, then we will also have to recognise in due course hundreds of shades and grades of temperaments. Fidelity to our own assumption shall compel us to do so ; and when we do so we will

also have to acquiesce in and recognize the necessity for hundreds of philosophies to suit various temperaments. Thus the task of eternal quest after truth and the ultimate standard of judgment of values or of finding the highest and surest test for the validity of our knowledge, shall all merely be reduced into the act of hopelessly giving up the pursuit of philosophy.

We cannot be pragmatists. Everybody is born either a Monist or a Pluralist. No one is born a Midwayist. It is inconceivable to be a pragmatist or a reconcilist in the matter. The Universe is either One or Many. To think of a third alternative is a sheer impossibility. Moreover, the aim and attempt of every ancient philosopher has been—whether successful or unsuccessful, is a different question altogether—to offer a philosophy that may stand alike for all. Pragmatism does not make any such attempt at all. It gives a blank card to one and all to write his choice philosophy on it, and to abide by it. It dupes him into the belief that it is true for him. It may be so for others or not. In its anxiety to reconcile all sides, and to triumph as a successful arbitrator, it says pluralism will do for tough-minded people, and monism can serve the mental cravings of tender-minded people. Why worry yourself about the real truth ? Just make out a philosophy of your own, as might suit your practical convenience as well as your

personal inclinations. This practical and expedient *Hypothesis*, an imaginary truth just discovered to suit your requirements and convenience, will be a truth so far as it goes with you. It does not matter if it can not serve the purpose of others. For them it may be a falsehood. It indirectly gives rise to a supposition that two truths which contradict each other, may exist among different people in different countries at one and the same time, if consequences useful to life flow from them, and if each is serving its purpose in its own respective sphere.

A philosopher cannot take up this attitude. He can not be so tolerant as that. A philosopher is a Spectator of the Universe and of the whole Eternity. A philosopher qua philosopher, has nothing to do with the utilities of the hour ; though he has to reckon with them as an animal, as a father, as a son, as a member of society , etc

Schiller says in his book "Humanism", page 11 "The pragmatic motives that dictate the philosophic question, 'What is reality?' being different, their bearing or application is also different, and different must be the replies". Schiller says *different*, not *contradictory*, but it comes to that. When by *Truth* you do not mean truth, simply, and exactly, in the intellectualistic sense, but mean something *different*,

since your reservations and bearings are your own, *viz.* pragmatic, it is apparent that it is not truth at all in the universal and accepted sense of the word. It is truth according to the separate individualistic new language which you have coined for your own unique reasons. In this fashion *water* could be called *fire*, because of a few calories of heat contained in it.

If we are arguing with a savage or a Cabuli Pathan, who threatens us with death when we threaten him with our logic and challenge his mode of reasoning, it is no doubt pragmatic and expedient to say we believe what he believes, but inwardly we cannot change our beliefs ; for it is not in our power to do so.

I say to A that B loves me, that B is kind to me. A asks as to what practical benefits have accrued to me from B? What gifts B has given me? Otherwise it cannot be true that B is kind to me or loves me. Does it not sound absurd reasoning on the very face of it ?

Living without knowing the art of living, and without having the rudder and compass of philosophy, howsoever crude, to guide us on our voyage of human life and to give us some outlook on life, is living in vain. There must be some philosophy to attract our attention to the points whose importance can never be exaggerated : Whence ? Whither ? and Why ?

Longfellow says : " Life is real, life is earnest." Emerson says : " The world is a big joke." Another philosopher says : " Life is a huge mockery." Who is right ? and who is wrong ? It is no less possible that all might be right, or all might be wrong. These are the sweet-bitter questions of philosophy.

دیکھنا یہ ہے کہ عالم کیا ہے
یار کی زلف نہ مار پیچان

(خداوند)

India specially has the honour of being the Home of Philosophy; and has been known since prehistoric times for its eternal and disinterested quest of Truth as evidenced by its six famous systems of philosophy: Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Purva Mimansa, and finally Vedanta, the king of doctrines and doctrine of the kings of the kingdom (or domain) of philosophy. We can give up the most cherished of our views, and the most expedient of our formulas, if Truth requires it. No religion or philosophy is higher than Truth.

Who can be more godly than Buddha? But because his honest pursuit of metaphysics and logic led him to atheism and even nihilism, he acquiesced in it. No pragmatic consideration of finding an excuse, defence or pretext of indulgences, could move him. The doctrine of *arthakriyakaritva*, viz. a tendency to pragmatism,

was very well known to the Buddhist philosophers in India; but the ancients always suppressed it, knowing the mischievousness and havoc it can work.

Popular art, popular science, and popular literature in the shape of cheap novels, already existed in the world. Only one thing was wanting: popular philosophy. This has been supplied by the pragmatists.

Suppose His Majesty makes me a Viceroy today, if I can help myself to believe that $2 + 2 = 5$. Is it not expedient for me then to believe it? From the pragmatic point of view, it becomes the truth then for me. Repugnant idea; stands self-condemned. In fact it is below dignity to contradict it. It is self-contradictory. Evidently false. But we have to contradict it for the sake of the general public, to save them from being duped into such a plausible and self-commending philosophy. People want to evade the maximum of strain required in the pursuit of philosophy accompanied with the minimum of loaves and fishes. Pragmatism, therefore, commends itself to people, of course educated and coming well within the category of cultured, and consequently needing some pretensions to the study of philosophy also. Pragmatism spreads its wings, and takes them in its folds. They come willingly, because it offers the line of least resistance.

My maternal uncle, the late Hon'ble Pandit Bishan Narayan Dar, Barrister-at-Law, President Indian National Congress, once spoke as under:—

“A curious medley of absurdities and crudities, inconsistencies and illogicalities, a bewildering maze prepared to confound common sense, a mosaic of contradictory elements, distrust of the educated classes, distrust of their own noble and well-tried principles of statesmanship, and an eager anxiety to take away with one hand what has been given with the other these are the marks which stamp the reforms as they come out of the official manufactory.” The above paragraph could, with slight alteration, be adapted to describe the pragmatist's position; *e. g.* ‘A curious medley of absurdities and crudities, inconsistencies and illogicalities, a bewildering maze prepared to confound common sense, a mosaic of contradictory elements, distrust of *their natural inclinations and spiritual leanings*, distrust of their own noble and well-tried principles of *deductive reasoning*, and an eager anxiety to take away with one hand, what has been *conceded by* the other, these are the marks which stamp the *arguments and explanations* as they come out of the *pragmatist's armoury*.


Now in conclusion, to sum up the whole situation in most polite words:—

Whether it is the development of truth itself (pragmatism), or it is the development of understanding

while the truth is eternally complete, we have to discover it. Pragmatic truth is in the making; rationalistic truth is with God. Pragmatists may give the analogy of the world's riches. An individual should mind whatever he possesses, and should not bother himself about the riches possessed by others.

Pragmatism does not satisfy our spiritual life—a life with a different scale values. Human experience and moral consciousness point to this fact.

The various ways of looking at truth or reality, may be made apparent at a glance by the following chart:—



BOOKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

Kaul's Miscellanies, No. 1, 'A Trilogue,' or "Can the Knower be Known." Suitable as a Christmas gift. Annas four per copy, post free to any address. Price payable in advance.

Opinion of the Press.

Copied from "The Jayaji Pratap" Gwalior, dated 24th November, 1927.

A TRILOGUE.

We are glad to discover that the spirit of humour and optimism which forms the lovable trait of Mr. Kaul's character, and of which his near friends and acquaintances get their daily allowance, has appeared in the form of a booklet, named "A Trilogue." This booklet has recently come out of the Press, and from it, it is trusted, the people will not fail to derive both, amusement and instruction. The one feature which arrests the attention of a reader is a comic representation of a person, who holding a quill in his hand, points heavenwards, which is the ultimate abode of all earthly beings. Apart from the flashes of wit which enrich the publication, we confine ourselves only to its instructive aspect. The problem which the author tackles with relates to "Knower" or "Consciousness." It is a problem which has been a favourite study of saints and savants in

different ages. There are moments when we are disposed to regard this world as unsubstantial or a mere dream; but there is not a moment when we can deny the existence of consciousness, which manifests itself in one state or the other.

The author, be it said to his credit, has endeavoured to dive deep into the realms of consciousness, and has succeeded in proving its real character, although to all appearances it seems to have disappeared completely in deep slumber. But alas this consciousness too becomes extinct with the destruction of physical life, and hence the note of the author: "I am inclined to believe that even my life upon its termination may be found to have been in reality a big dream". The booklet ends with a sound advice of a dying mother to his son. And this serves as a mentor to us inculcating the lesson of duty we owe to others as well as to ourselves.

Copied from "United India and Indian States," Delhi, dated 26th November, 1927.

A TRILOGUE.

This is a short philosophic discourse on whether "Consciousness" is different from the "Content of Consciousness". Its conclusion is best put in the form of the Biblical expression, "If salt would not salt itself, wherewith could we salt it". The moral drawn from the discourse is that just as salt cannot salt anything

without being salty itself, so a person cannot make another happy without being truly happy himself. The booklet is worth-reading.

Kaul's Miscellanies, No. 2. "Duty towards Parents and Children". Annas four per copy, post free to any address. Price payable in advance.

Opinion of the Press.

Copied from "The Jayaji Pratap," Gwalior, dated 16th February, 1928.

Duty towards Parents and Children.

"Duty towards Parents and Children" is the title of a pamphlet recently issued by Mr. V. Kaul. The author has brought forward three main questions—How to educate children? When to educate them? and Why to obey and respect parents?—and has given adequate and weighty answers to them. Before now the parents might have been seeking the line of least resistance in sending the boy to a school, and avoiding all painful efforts on their part to "prepare good children." But henceforth they will not do so without a prick of their own conscience, for the author in this publication has explained both by argument and illustration that there exists no hard and fast line between the education of the parents and their offspring; and has concluded by saying, "Parents should culture themselves, for in this way, though indirectly, they can educate their children most easily

and with the best results." What the author says here is somewhat startling but nevertheless true. The best part of the pamphlet, however, contains his answer to the question, "Why to obey and respect parents." The author here gives some thoughts of his own, which are suggestive of loyalty and obedience, and have their fitting climax in "the golden example of Madhav Maharaj."

In the end we are tempted to congratulate Mr. V. Kaul on his safe return from the land of spirits—the scene of his first adventures—to the real world governed by Universal Laws. This world, we hope, will not disappoint him by giving the cold shoulder to his thought-provoking pamphlets.

Copied from the "United India and Indian States," Delhi, dated 10th March, 1928.

Duty towards Parents and Children.

"This booklet contains two essays which may be regarded as supplementing each other. The first on "Our Duty towards Children" lays special stress on prenatal influences. The second deals with the duty of children towards their parents. The ideal held before the eyes of the Indian youths in the second essay is that of the sincere devotion of the late Maharaja Madhavrao Scindia for his venerable mother. The essays are well worth reading."

By Vishwanath Kaul, M. A., Inderganj Street, Gwalior.

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